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Love in Love’s Labour’s Lost:
Ontological Foundation or Laughing
Matter?
Andy Mousley
1 The domain of folly in Love’s Labour’s Lost is an ever-expanding domain in which love
plays the leading role.1 Folly is so pervasive in the play that it verges on becoming an
existential statement. What makes the world go round is not love or money or power or
the desire for knowledge, but folly. We may chase after these desirables, but if we look
back over our shoulder we will probably see folly not far behind, laughing at us for one
or another foolish impulse which is driving our endeavour, whether we know it or not.
As Erasmus’ Praise of Folly makes clear, folly appears in different guises and has several
friends and associates, one being self-love: 
Is there any duty throughout life which you can perform [asks Folly], unless
you have Self-love at hand to help you, Self-love who is so prompt to take my
place on all occasions that she is rightly called my sister? What is so foolish
as self-satisfaction and self-admiration? But then what agreeable, pleasant or
graceful act can you perform if you aren’t self-satisfied?2 
2 Characteristically,  Erasmus’s  Folly does not deliver a simple or single message,  safe
from the ambivalences of irony and paradox. Does the folly of narcissistic self-love and
self-admiration only make us laughable and ridiculous, or does this form of folly serve
some necessary  and important  purpose?  Without  any shred of  self-love,  life  would
quickly become unbearable. Yet, self-admiration can easily make fools of us. Whatever
wisdom may ultimately be redeemed from folly, an awareness of the ubiquity of folly as 
folly gives rise to the humbling perspective that human existence is cause for laughter,
mirth and ridicule. ‘Humour’, argues the philosopher Simon Critchley, ‘recalls us to the
modesty and limitedness of the human condition, a limitedness that calls not for tragic-
heroic  affirmation  but  comic  acknowledgement,  not  Promethean  authenticity  but  a
laughable  inauthenticity’.3 The  only  earnest  message  of  comedy,  at  least  from  this
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perspective on humour, is not to be too earnest, and especially perhaps, when it comes
to affairs of the heart and the foundational certainties that the heart seeks.
3 As  I  have  argued  elsewhere,  Shakespearean  comedy  does  not  entirely  banish
seriousness, but this is hard-won and pitted against the comic injunction not to take
ourselves and our desire for foundations and certainties over-seriously.4 This is one of
the ways comedy typically orients us towards human life. In tragedy, we are made to
feel the removal of firm foundations intensely, as loss. In Othello, for example, Othello’s
jealous mind anxiously inhabits the gap between perception and reality: ‘By the world’,
he says to Iago, ‘I think my wife be honest, and think she is not. / I think that thou art
just, and think thou art not.’5 The dream of transparency, whereby one consciousness is
so umbilically joined to another that communication seems redundant, is ruined by
jealousy and the green-eyed monster’s insinuation that we might, after all, be strangers
to one another.  In comedy,  however,  certainty is  more often than not mocked and
uncertainty embraced. It is the way of the comic world, for example, to make category
errors whereby inauthentic passions and urges get mistaken for authentic ones. Out of
this irreverently treated confusion can come clarification as well as seriousness, but
seriousness is not as immediately acceptable in the comic universe as it is in the tragic
one. Those who wax prematurely serious about the nature of love, for example, are
likely to be seen as pontificators. In comedy, earnestness has to be earned. The only
unqualified  seriousness  that  comedy  allows  is  once  again  not to  take  ourselves
seriously. Only with that premise in place can other serious conclusions follow.
4 In Love’s Labour’s Lost, ridicule’s net expands to include virtually all of the characters in
the  play.  Even  those  characters  who  themselves  ridicule  are  in  turn  ridiculed  for
counting themselves above ridicule. The scene which in particular demonstrates folly’s
gradual colonisation of the world of the play is the one in which one courtier after
another  achieves  comic  ascendancy  only  for  his  position of  superiority  to  be
immediately  overturned.  Having  collectively  foresworn  love,  each  courtier
(predictably) falls in love and is (equally predictably) found out. The (unpredictable)
method of finding out nicely ridicules the ridiculer and turns the one-upmanship of ego
humour into a shared recognition of  our ‘laughable inauthenticity’,  to recall  Simon
Critchley’s phrase. First the King comes onstage to read his love sonnet alone – or so he
thinks  –  and  then  stands  aside  to  overhear  Longueville  do  exactly  the  same.  This
pattern is repeated and so, too, is the subsequent exposure of one courtier by another.
Longueville  steps  forward  to  tell  Dumaine  that  ‘I  should  blush,  I  know,  /  To  be
o’erheard and taken napping so’, only for the King to use Longueville’s own words to
shame Longueville himself: ‘Come sir, you blush. As his, your case is such. / You chide
at him, offending twice as much’.6
5 The figure who has overseen and overheard everything without yet being exposed is
Biron, whose scorn is significantly more vitriolic than the previous two exposers of
folly. Where Longueville and the King talk about being shamed in terms of blushing,
Biron talks about whipping and hypocrisy: ‘Now step I forth to whip hypocrisy.’ (IV.iii.
149).  Biron’s  aggressive  Juvenalian  satire  makes  a  proverbial  mountain  out  of  a
molehill. It makes a catastrophe of folly. By contrast, the thought that the appropriate
response to being found out is ‘merely’ to blush normalises folly. Folly is cause for ‘only
human’ comic embarrassment rather than tragedy. Biron, as the King points out, has
struck the wrong tone; his ‘jest’ is too ‘bitter’ (IV.iii.172).
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6 Blushing  also  feminises  the  courtiers,  because  blushing  has  conventionally  been
associated  with  femininity.7 The  levelling  principle  of  comedy  applies  to  gender
identities,  and  perhaps  especially  to  gender  identities  in  Shakespeare’s  comedies,
because gender hierarchies are overturned by virtue of women being designated, for
reasons which will become clear, as custodians of the human. Women are in other words
placed  in  important  roles  above men  as  salvagers  of  threatened  human  values  or
resources. One area to which this clearly applies is love. But it also applies to folly and
the recognition of folly. The courtiers need to recognise that folly is normal, that they
are foolish to think that they are immune from it, and that folly is not cause for the
kind of moral panic that the scourge Biron thinks it is. Biron’s moment of triumph is in
any case short-lived as his love is in turn exposed and he is himself levelled by folly: ‘I
confess, I confess … That you three fools lacked me fool to make up the mess.’ (IV.iii.
203-5). Thus folly, as I suggested earlier, fast becomes the existential norm rather than
exception, such that, as C. L. Barber puts it in Shakespeare’s Festive Comedy (1959): ‘in the
classic manner of Erasmus in his Praise of Folly, it becomes folly not to be a fool’.8
7 But here we need to return to the question: what kind of fool? As both Erasmus’ Praise
of  Folly  and  Shakespeare’s  plays  demonstrate,  there  are  fools  and  fools,  wise  and
otherwise.9 Following the lead of the aphorism quoted by Touchstone in As You Like It
that ‘The fool doth think he is wise, but the wise man knows himself to be a fool’,10 we
could say that the wise fool knows that humans are prone to folly, is able to laugh at
himself, recognises his own limits (and the limits of human beings in general) and is
aware that claims to authenticity and knowledge can be, at best, premature, and at
worst, permanently unrealistic. However, Touchstone’s aphorism can be understood as
not simply inverting the categories of wisdom and folly, but as confusing them, for it
suggests, as is common in Shakespeare, that things are not always as they may seem.
One thing – wisdom – may be or may become an entirely different thing – folly. But that
different thing may then morph into something else. In the Shakespearean universe,
categories are de-stabilised, and not simply inverted. In such a topsy-turvy world, what
counts as foolish and worthy of ridicule,  on the one hand, and wise and worthy of
serious attention on the other, may not always be clear-cut. So when and where are we
to take love’s fools in Love’s  Labour’s Lost seriously? Under what conditions do these
fools for love qualify for earnest treatment? Is their courtship mere ‘lining to the time’
(V.ii.773), as the Queen later calls it, or is there some serious point to it? We might be
tempted, early on, to level such earnest accusations at the courtiers as: they are shallow
and depthless, they have learnt all their love lore from not very good love poetry and
consequently know little or nothing about the realities of loving. But such accusations,
though valid,  may seem untimely  and unseasonable.  Would only  a  fool  who thinks
himself wise, like the pedant Holofernes, spoil the festive spirit in the name of such
sobering truths? When is the right moment, if ever there is one, to unmask the foolish
illusions of human beings and identify the truth that they seem unable to fathom? 
8 When the scholars turned lovers in Love’s Labour’s Lost find out that each one of them
has forsworn their vow to devote themselves exclusively to the life of the mind, they
turn to Biron to justify their about-turn. ‘Now prove / Our loving lawful’, says the King
‘and our faith not torn’. Dumaine follows suit: ‘Ay, marry there, some flattery for this
evil’ and Longueville in similar vein pleads for ‘some authority how to proceed, / Some
tricks, some quillets how to cheat the devil’ (IV.iii.282-86). Some fake, trumped-up show
of authority, based on ‘tricks’ and ‘quillets’ (meaning quibbles) will do, it seems. Some
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illusion of authority is all that is required because uppermost in the courtiers’ minds is
the imperative not to lose face. At the same time, there is a sophisticated knowingness
on the part of the courtiers of the fact that their faces are faces which are continually
at risk of being seen through and which might in fact be interesting to lose, or at least
to contemplate losing.  Why interesting? Because to put identity at  risk is  to create
suspense, and in the case of romantic comedy, to create the conditions for play and
foreplay. Part of the flirtatious banter which occurs between the two principal groups
is  a  form of  verbal  striptease  in  which a  covering or  disguise  is  unveiled,  only  for
another layer to stand in the way of complete nakedness. 
9 When the courtiers disguise themselves as Russians, for the benefit of the women who
are themselves masked, appearances are layered one on top of another: 
ROSALINE: How many weary steps,
Of many weary miles you have o’ergone,
Are numbered in the travel of one mile?
BIRON: We number nothing that we spend for you.
Our duty is so rich, so infinite,
That we may do it still without account.
Vouchsafe to show the sunshine of your face, 
That we, like savages, may worship it.
ROSALINE: My face is but a moon, and clouded too.
KING: Blessed are clouds, to do as such clouds do.
Vouchsafe, bright moon, and these thy stars, to shine,
Those clouds removed, upon our watery eyne.
ROSALINE: O vain petitioner, beg a greater matter!
Thou now requests but moonshine in the water. 
(V.ii.194-207)
10 Beneath the appearance of the Russian is Biron the courtier speaking romantic clichés
about the dazzling appearance he imagines seeing beneath the mask worn by Rosaline
who then exposes the revelation desired by the courtiers as insubstantial: nothing but
‘moonshine in the water’. These are ‘sign[s] of she’ to borrow a phrase of Biron’s, not
the  ‘she  herself’  (V.ii.468-9).  But  the  comedic  play  of  signs,  replete  with  mistaken
identities, category errors, and metaphorically missing persons have kindled the fires
of  desire  at  the  same  time  as  they  have  opened  love  to  playful  uncertainty.  For
underneath one ‘sign of she’ may be another sign, and then another, ad infinitum. It is a
relatively  easy  and  obvious  point  to  make  that  the  courtiers  routinely  replace  the
actual objects of their devotion with clichéd, textual versions of them, versions which
are more in keeping with the bookish ways they are supposed to have relinquished
than with ‘real life’. But this kind of unmasking once again seems untimely. To appeal
soberly to some ‘real’ Rosaline beneath the signs she is taken or mistaken for does not
seem, at this point in the play, the right kind of move. The festive spirit of the play
makes  any  such  quest  for  ‘reality’,  ‘truth’,  ‘authenticity’  and  foundations  seem
inappropriately, or to recall the phrase I used earlier, unseasonably leaden. Yes, it is
true, that the romantic illusions of the men are habitually punctured by the women,
but simple oppositions between appearance and reality, illusion and truth, authenticity
and  inauthenticity,  the  substantial  and  the  insubstantial,  the  disembodied  and  the
down-to-earth, are not immediately enforced. After Rosaline has wittily implied that
the courtiers’ romantic idealisations are empty, instead of ending the dance of words
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and signs whose relation to reality is no doubt always in doubt, she begins another
‘game of wit’: 
ROSALINE: O vain petitioner, beg a greater matter!
Thou now requests but moonshine in the water.
KING: Then in our measure do but vouchsafe one change 
Thou bid’st me beg; this begging is not strange 
ROSALINE: Play music, then! [Music plays] Nay, you must do it soon.
Not yet? No dance! Thus change I like the moon.
(V.ii.207-11)
11 Rosaline is not, at this stage, a killjoy. She does not want the play to stop in the name of
some sobering truth about who she really is. What she wants is better and faster play,
play  that  moves  the  game  of  love  beyond  the  tired,  worn-out  clichés  wittingly  or
unwittingly  recycled  by  the  courtiers.  In  a  trice,  Rosaline  asks  for  dance  music,
demands an instant response - ‘you must do it soon’ - then immediately cancels the
request as if to suggest that the courtiers are just too sluggish, too slow off the mark. If
there is to be a play of appearances, a comedy of mistaken or half-mistaken identities,
then  let  that  play  be  more  fleet-footed  and  energetic,  with  a  view, perhaps,  to
exhausting itself more quickly than at the slower pace set by the men. 
12 The guises and disguises of lovers are not so much unmasked in the name of truth,
then, as transformed into different faces. What applies to the ostensible objects of the
lovers’  devotions  also  applies  to  love  itself.  For  love  itself  rapidly  changes  face.  It
changes hue just as quickly as the scholars-turned-lovers-turned-Russians do. Love is a
gallimaufry of infatuation, idolatry, tyranny, narcissism, compassion, folly, blindness,
madness, drunkenness, giddiness, religion, fine feeling and agent of civilisation. When
Biron in  Act  3  declares  himself  in  love  it  is  as  one  who has  been smitten  by  that
‘wimpled, whining, purblind, wayward boy ... Dan Cupid’: 
And I, forsooth, in love! I that have been love’s whip,
A very beadle to a humorous sigh,
A critic, nay, a night-watch constable, 
A domineering pedant o’er the boy,
Than whom no mortal so magnificent!
This wimpled, whining, purblind, wayward boy.
This Signor Junior, giant dwarf, Dan Cupid
Regent of love-rhymes, lord of all folded arms,
Th’anointed sovereign of sighs and groans [...] 
[...] O my little heart!
And I to be corporal of his field 
And wear his colours like a tumbler’s hoop! 
(III.i.169-83)
13 Love here is folly, and unambiguously so, it seems, with no redeemable wisdom about
it,  as  far  as  Biron  is  concerned.  Yet  called  upon  a  few  scenes  later  to  justify  the
courtiers’  disavowal  of  their  life  of  scholarship,  Biron  rises  to  the  occasion  by
venerating love and turning it into a form of religion: 
[Love] adds a precious seeing to the eye – 
A lover’s eyes will gaze an eagle blind. 
A lover’s ear will hear the lowest sound
When the suspicious head of theft is stopped.
Love’s feeling is more soft and sensible 
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Than are the tender horns of cockled snails. [...]
And when Love speaks, the voice of all the gods
Make heaven drowsy with the harmony.
Never durst poet touch a pen to write
Until his ink were tempered with Love’s sighs.
O, then his lines would ravish savage ears,
And plant in tyrants mild humility.
From women’s eyes this doctrine I derive:
They sparkle still the right Promethean fire;
They are the books, the arts, the academes,
That show, contain, and nourish all the world,
Else none at all in aught proves excellent. 
(IV.iii.309-30)
14 Biron’s command of words is such that he can do what he will with them, here re-
creating the meaning of love as occasion demands, in response to Longueville’s plea to
Biron to conjure up ‘some authority how to proceed, / Some tricks, some quillets, how
to cheat the devil’ (IV.iii.285-6). Here, then, is another appearance, or so it might seem,
except for the fact  that at  some indeterminate point or another,  we might become
weary of the endless substitution of one signifier of love for another. We might begin to
want more substance, and probably at the prompting of characters (like Rosaline, for
example)  who play,  but  play semi-seriously,  with a  view to discriminating between
more or less substantial and more or less shallow appeals to love. And perhaps Biron’s
speech does not itself present just another ‘appearance’ of love. Perhaps we might say,
in imitation of the play’s own propensity for paradox, that what Biron’s speech offers is
a ‘seeming appearance’, an appearance masquerading as a profound reality about love
but one which might have some truth to it. As is well-known, rhetorical training in the
Renaissance involved arguing in utramque partem, either side of a case. As Aristotle and
subsequent  theorists  of  rhetoric  proposed,  rhetoric  produced  knowledge  that  was
probable rather than certain. Rhetorical love - love subjected to continuous rhetorical
treatment – is in danger in Love’s Labour’s Lost of becoming empty love, love in which
style reigns permanently over substance, manner over matter, eloquence over wisdom.
Yet the ‘sweet smoke of rhetoric’ (III.i.61), including amorous rhetoric, which is clearly
the object of the play’s satire is not always and only an object of ridicule, for there is
sometimes just enough ‘probability’ in what is said about love to make us wonder what
truths might lie hidden or half-hidden in the play’s various rhetorical excursions.
15 To talk about matters of truth and substance is of course to wax metaphysical.  The
universalising, foundation-seeking cast of thinking that is bound up with metaphysics
has not been in favour amongst culturally-inclined, historically-minded critics over the
last forty years. Yet the play nudges its way towards the ‘seriousness’ of a foundation-
seeking philosophy of love even as it subjects love and lovers to mockery, and mediates
its metaphysics through the dialogic, ‘probabilising’ conduits of drama and rhetoric.
Another way of thinking about these questions is to suggest that there are two comic
registers  operating  in  tandem  in  Love’s  Labour’s  Lost:  one  festive,  mocking,  ‘light’,
playful and deflating of attempts upon seriousness;  the other -  more of a narrative
structure than a register - seeking clarification amidst the topsi-turvy world of illusions
and misperceptions also inherent to comedy. As C. L. Barber, Northrop Frye and others
have recognised, comedy can be a plot structure which is also a ritualistic patterning of
experience, leading from confusion to clarification, or from the destruction of selves
through ridicule and mayhem to the tentative renewal of them.11
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16 Biron himself uses the language of self-loss and self-renewal – ‘Let us once lose our
oaths to find ourselves, / Or else we lose ourselves to keep our oaths’ (IV.iii.338-9). In so
doing, he nudges the play into becoming an existential quest-narrative, whereby an
inauthentic self is shed in favour of a more authentic one, and the superficialities to
which lovers are prone are cast aside to reveal a deeper wisdom about love. For all
Biron’s  verbal  showmanship,  which  in  festive  manner  releases  language  from  the
necessity of ‘meaning’, the other comedic register present in the play is invoked in this
semi-serious quest for renewal and rebirth. I emphasise semi-serious because Biron’s
grandiose  elevation  of  love  can  be  simultaneously  read  as  a  mock-elevation.  The
doubling  of  comic  perspective  means  that  we  are  again  made to  wonder  when we
should begin to weigh love’s claims. Has Biron yet proved himself worthy to be taken
seriously? Has he earned the right to be earnest? 
17 It is not easy to say exactly when or where we should begin asking such truth-questions
about love as: is love de-sublimated as sexual desire, ‘flesh’ made ‘deity’ (IV.iii.71-3), as
Biron puts it, the truth about love? Or is the neo-platonised version of love he invokes
in his later speech the truth that gives the lie to the reductive materialism of the flesh?
Love, so Biron claims, deepens perception, adding ‘a precious seeing to the eye’ (IV.iii.
309); it sensitises – ‘Love’s feeling is […] soft and sensitive’ (IV.iii.313); love also civilises,
ravishing ‘savage ears’  (IV.iii.324);  it  humbles by planting ‘in tyrants mild humility’
(IV.iii.325)  and  brings  ‘harmony’  (IV.iii.321).  Are  these  all  throw-away  lines  which
affirm nothing but the extensiveness of Biron’s verbal repertoire? Or do some of them
make affective and ontological claims upon us? It is tempting to be drawn in by at least
some of these apotheoses, such as the idea that ‘love adds a precious seeing to the eye’,
for this statement evokes a metaphysics of engagement. I emphasise ‘evokes’ because
Biron does not spell out what precious seeing might involve. He may fancy himself a
philosopher but he is not a systematic one. Nevertheless he hints at a philosophy of
love,  based upon engagement.  To  turn the  probable  knowledge  of  a  foolish  lover’s
rhetoric into something more substantial  I  want to turn briefly to one of  the most
illuminatingly synoptic perspectives on love to have emerged recently, which is that of
the philosopher Simon May. ‘If we all have a need to love’, writes May, 
it is because we all need to feel at home in the world: to root our life in the
here  and  now;  to  give  our  existence  solidity  and  validity;  to  deepen  the
sensation  of  being;  to  enable  us  to  experience  the  reality  of  our  life  as
indestructible (even if we all also accept that our life is temporary and will
end in death.) 
18 May  places  these  various  wants  and  needs  under  his  ur-category,  ‘ontological
rootedness’.  The need to  feel  ontologically  rooted can according to  May be  met  in
different ways: 
At first, home is our mother and father; gradually its possibilities become
larger  and more complex:  they might  include our  work,  our  friends,  our
children, nature, God. Or places, ideas, and ideals. Or contrary to common
prejudice – money or status and the people who offer us access to it.  For
these can powerfully root, even if they are less noble and more obviously
instrumental than other objects of love.12 
19 The  promise  of  love,  as  philosophized  by  May,  is  that  it  acts  as  a  solution  to  the
perplexities, uncertainties and divisions of existence by rooting us and deepening ‘the
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sensation of being’ as he puts it. May’s idea is close to Biron’s idea of precious seeing,
seeing that is precious because it makes us feel fully engaged in the world rather than
at odds with it. 
20 To begin with, as is common with romantic love, ontological rootedness takes place
inside the lover’s narcissistic imagination. There is someone, seemingly out there, who
makes the world seem less alien, less hostile, and worth living in. But the love object is
an image or ideal that exists in the mind of the lover and bears little relation to reality.
Narcissistic romantic love and ego-humour, humour designed to bolster the self at the
expense  of  another,  go  hand  in  hand  in  Love’s  Labour’s  Lost.  Both  have  to  be
relinquished. The narcissism of love has to be abandoned through the realisation that
the romantic perception of the person and the person herself (whoever that might be)
may not coincide. And ego-humour, in the case of Biron, has to cede place to humour
sensitive to the condition of the sick and the dying. This is the love-test set by Rosaline
for Biron, one which now definitely injects seriousness into the ‘sport’ of the play. Of
the many proverbs in Love’s Labour’s Lost, often used glibly – sportively – as possible
containers  for  experience,  Rosaline’s  at  the  end  of  the  play  stands  out  as  one
demanding unambiguously serious consideration: ‘A jest’s prosperity lies in the ear / of
him that hears it, never in the tongue / Of him that makes it’ (V.ii.847-9). Rosaline’s
emphasis on reception rather than production instructs Biron that the tellers of jokes
are dependent on their listeners, that listeners should be regarded as more than a pair
of admiring ears and that this should be reflected in a more intimate knowledge of
one’s audience/s. Transferred to the domain of love, this means that Biron will need to
subject the ‘ontological rootedness’ that he desires from love to the risk of an actual
relationship rather than one that exists in his head. If love is a ‘precious seeing’ because
it engages us meaningfully in and with the world, then this ‘seeing’ will have to be
more attentive, and accept that love beyond narcissism does not come with absolute
guarantees.
21 The labour of love might have been lost in this comedy if  its sole comic mode was
festive,  but  its  other  comic  mode,  involving  a  search  for  clarification  and wisdom,
means that love is not only a laughing matter and sign of human folly. We do need to
acknowledge the folly of taking ourselves, especially our romantic selves, too seriously,
and the play implicitly warns against premature philosophising. Yet the play, especially
at  the  end,  lays  down  conditions  for  being  taken  seriously  as  a  lover,  and  these
conditions may then make us seriously – and even anxiously – wonder what remains of
love beyond the many appearances it has assumed during the course of the play. 
22 Injecting another sombre note into the comedy, the Queen has this blunt message for
the men: 
We have received your letters, full of love,
Your favours, the ambassadors of love,
And in our maiden council rated them
At courtship, pleasant jest, and courtesy,
As bombast and as lining to the time.
But more devout than this in our respects
Have we not been, and therefore met your loves 
In their own fashion, like a merriment. (V.ii.769-76)
23 Dumaine’s response to this is: ‘Our letters … showed much more than jest’ (V.ii.777). ‘So
did our looks’  (V.ii.778) is  Longueville’s  supporting comment.  Rosaline’s  response is
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curt: ‘We did not quote them so’ (V.ii.779). Easy protestations of serious intent are not
good enough. 
24 Here and elsewhere in Shakespeare’s plays (Rosalind in As You Like It, Paulina in The
Winter’s Tale, Cordelia as the albeit initially ignored spokeswoman for love in King Lear),
women  are  empowered  in  relation  to  love  and  men  disempowered.  Women  are
educators, sages and judges and men, novices. While this might be read as reinforcing
gender  stereotypes  by  relegating  women to  a  private  rather  than public  sphere  of
influence,  such  is  the  importance  of  love  to  worlds  that  are  often  presented  in
Shakespeare’s plays (comedies and tragedies alike) as heartless, that to be an arbiter of
love  is  to  be  significantly  empowered.  Moreover,  love  is  hardly  ever  just  a  private
matter between two people, for its significance is constantly being amplified. In the
world of Shakespearean comedy, people not only fall in love (or think that they do),
they talk about it, reflect upon it, justify their falling in love and expand their self-
justifications  into  heavyweight  existential  statements.  For  women  to  intervene  in
matters of affection, and stipulate the conditions for being taken seriously as a lover, is
therefore to intervene in no ‘merely domestic’ affair.
25 I will conclude by offering a brief word about my method in this paper, in the context
of  what  I  see  as  currently  happening  in  literary  studies.  We  are  emerging  into  a
situation in which it is once more possible to talk, provisionally and self-reflexively of
course, about the human. For a long time, this did not seem possible. That is because
anti-essentialist scepticism towards human universals has been one of the prevailing
orthodoxies in the literary academy over the last forty years. History and historically
contingent  ideologies  are  taken  to  shape  human  consciousness,  not  the  other  way
round. The ‘very idea of a “defining human essence” is precisely what new historicists
find vacuous and untenable’, wrote Stephen Greenblatt in 1990, and this sentiment is
one widely shared by historicist critics, of different hues, both before and after 1990.13
Love’s labour was therefore itself often lost by hard-line historicists. In 1982, Arthur
Marotti  wrote  what  was  to  become  an  influential  essay  called  “‘Love  is  not  love’:
Elizabethan Sonnet Sequences and the Social  Order”.  Reversing what he saw as the
formalist  fallacy of  removing texts  from their  social  contexts,  Marotti  restored the
public dimension of putatively private poems and treated ‘love’ as the medium through
which Elizabethan socioeconomic circumstances reveal themselves. ‘Love lyrics’ writes
Marotti, ‘could express figuratively the realities of suit, service and recompense with
which  ambitious  men  were  insistently  concerned  as  well  as  the  frustrations  and
disappointments  experienced  in  socially  competitive  environments’.14 Love  is  thus
treated by Marotti less as a phenomenon in its own right than an epi-phenomenon, a
secondary  symptom  of  a  cause  located  elsewhere,  in  the  struggle  for  position  and
employment at court.15 The ostensible subject matter of sonnet sequences, namely love,
was thus displaced in Marotti's essay by the ‘real’ subject matter of the sonnets, namely
courtiership and power.  But critics  and theorists  have been turning their  attention
once more to the human (including the posthuman as an ever-present attendant of the
human), and humanisms and the humanities are being variously re-capitulated and re-
invented. The question then is how literature in general and Shakespeare in particular
help us to think about existential questions. What is the specificity of literature in the
way that it treats human life? In the case of Love’s Labour’s Lost, as with all literary texts,
we  have  to  reckon  with  form,  genre  and  medium,  and  with  the  way  its  comedy
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encourages us to attend to love in distinctive and emotionally complex ways, as the
provider simultaneously of mirth, anxiety and seriousness. 
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ABSTRACTS
Love’s labour is often lost in Shakespeare’s (un)romantic comedy because love is folly and lovers,
ridiculous. We know, however, that Shakespeare delights in paradoxes and reversals which alert
us to the possibility of finding wisdom in folly and folly in self-professed wisdom. Given the
insisted-upon interchangeability  of  wisdom and folly  in  Shakespeare’s plays,  how can we be
confident of being able to tell them apart? If lovers are foolish in Love’s Labour’s Lost then what
wisdom might there be in their folly? When Biron puts his mind to proving the value of love he
makes various grandiose claims. One is that love ‘adds a precious seeing to the eye’. Should we
treat this as a truth or a seeming truth, a nugget of wisdom about the way love can ‘deepen the
sensation  of  being’  (Peter  May)  or  just  another  depthless,  well-turned  phrase?  This  paper
explores the question of when and under what conditions love can be taken seriously in Love’s
Labour’s Lost.
Les peines d’amour sont souvent perdues dans la comédie (non)romantique de Shakespeare, car
l’amour est folie et les amoureux, ridicules. Toutefois, nous savons que Shakespeare affectionne
les paradoxes et les renversements qui nous font prendre conscience que la folie peut receler une
part de sagesse et la prétendue sagesse, une part de folie. Etant donné l’interchangeabilité de la
sagesse et de la folie dans les pièces de Shakespeare, comment être sûr de pouvoir les distinguer ?
Si les amants font preuve de folie dans Peines d’amour perdues, alors peut-être y a-t-il une certaine
sagesse  dans  leur  folie ?  Lorsqu’il  s’efforce  de  prouver  la  valeur  de  l’amour,  Biron  énonce
quelques déclarations grandioses, dont une selon laquelle l’amour « donne à l’œil une précieuse
seconde vue ». Doit-on voir là une vérité, même partielle, une once de sagesse relative à la façon
dont l’amour peut « approfondir la sensation d’être » (Peter May), ou simplement une expression
brillante  de plus,  dépourvue de toute  profondeur ?  Le  présent  article  explore  la  question de
savoir  quand  et  à  quelles  conditions  l’amour  peut  être  considéré  sérieusement  dans  Peines
d’amour perdues.
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